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Abstract
We consider a model in which Cournot-Nash oligopolistic service providers
are able to trade radio spectrum licences, subject to interference constraints.
The terms of trade are endogenised through Nash bargaining. When the
providers are in the same (geographical) market, the incentive to trade is due
to cost di®erences; when they are in separate markets, di®erential demand
conditions can also stimulate trade. We show that trade can enhance the
productive e±ciency of service provision (by concentrating production in low
cost ¯rms) but the resulting service consumer prices may have negative wel-
fare implications. We then present numerical results from a program designed
to simulate trading scenarios. these results illustrate a number of outcomes
of allowing licence trades. We discuss a number of applications and exten-
sions for our model and the relevance of our results for current government
consultations on spectrum trading.
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As new radio systems are brought into service and existing ones extended, the in-
centive to ¯nd new ways of using spectrum e±ciently is increasing. One aspect of
spectrum e±ciency concerns the hardware used when implementing radio systems;
advances in technology lead to new generations of equipment, which increase the
tra±c that can be carried by a given piece of spectrum. A second aspect is assign-
ment e±ciency and the channel assignment problem, namely the possible ways of
assigning radio channels to individual transmitters once the hardware speci¯cation
has been agreed. Both these forms of e±ciency can be regarded as `technical e±-
ciency', namely being at the frontier of the production possibilities set and therefore
producing a given amount of `output' in some sense with the minimum amount
of any given input, including the radio spectrum. This paper is concerned with a
third aspect, economic Pareto-e±ciency which implies but goes beyond technical
e±ciency.
Previous work by the authors (Leese et al. (2000)|henceforth LLR) was the
¯rst to study technical and economic e±ciency in an integrated fashion. This work
showed how a regulator facing a large number of licensees could make a ¯rst-best
choice of a licence fees in order to maximize social welfare within the technical
constraints of channel assignment. However the implementation of such a scheme
makes considerable informational demands on the regulator. As well as having
complete knowledge of the technical constraints, the regulator would also need to
know the cost and demand conditions of all actual and potential licensees. We now
propose to relax these assumptions by studying general bilateral trading mechanisms
which only require the regulator to know the technical radio spectrum constraints.
Our work follows a developing theme in the general area of telecommunications
policy: that \market mechanisms are superior to regulatory processes in achiev-
ing e±cient transactions amongst operators. ...[assuming] ...clear rules" (Spiller
and Cardilli (1997)). These authors discuss the merits of deregulation in the con-
text of national telecommunications operators. In subsequent work, they make the
1case (based on \experiments" in New Zealand and Guatemala) for deregulation of
spectrum licensing (Spiller and Cardilli (1999)).
The decentralised allocation of property rights in spectrum can take place in a
variety of ways. Arguably, the auctions held in the US and the UK over the past
decade provide an example of a `market-driven' distribution of initial endowments
of spectrum. Another mechanism allows trading of spectrum between users once the
initial endowments are determined. Such `spectrum trading' has been introduced
abroad (Spiller and Cardilli (1999)) and promulgated in the UK, most recently in
the Radiocommunication Agency's Radio Spectrum Management Review (Radio-
communications Agency (2001)). The Review argues that decentralised trade can
enhance productive e±ciency by placing spectrum in the hands of those who value it
most highly. It acknowledges, however, that there may be objections on allocative
grounds due to the anti-competitive e®ects of, for example, spectrum hoarding. It
is interesting that the current project bears directly on this point. We show that,
even in a world without asymmetric information between ¯rms, with cooperative
bargaining (and, therefore, none of the strategic reasons for capacity investment
found in, say, Dixit (1980)), a danger of such hoarding still exists. In our case, this
is because cost conditions in the market are such that production is most e±ciently
concentrated in the hands of a small oligopoly (or, indeed, monopoly).
When considering tradeable property rights (such as those created by spectrum
trading), it is instructive to look at examples from other contexts, to examine the
conditions most suitable for success. Tradeable pollution permits are a helpful case
in point (see e.g. Tietenberg (1990)). One policy initiative which has received much
publicity in this area is the US Clean Air Act 1990, whose Title IV amendments
provide the ¯rst large-scale use of tradeable pollution permits.1 This legislation
provided for the trading of permits for electricity generators to `produce' SO2. Ex-
perience here suggests that the trading had several valuable e®ects, including reduc-
tion of SO2 emissions below target levels, encouraging the use of e±cient abatement
1See Joskow et al. (1998); Joskow and Schmalensee (1998); Schmalensee et al. (1998) and Stavins
(1998).
2technology and the creation of an e±cient (and, therefore, informationally valuable)
market in these permits. Interestingly, the last of these was stimulated by annual
auctions of a small percentage of permits in order to publicise the common value of
the permits. As a result, within four years, the number of bilateral permit trades
(of the type we model here) had grown to over 5 million; 17 times the number of
permits bought at auction. This suggests that, with a suitable regulatory framework
(as referred to by Spiller and Cardilli (1997)), trading can °ourish.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief sum-
mary of the channel assignment problem and its relevance to the economic problem.
Section 3 sets out the `core' economic model of a single local market consisting of
an oligopoly producing a homogeneous service requiring radio channels as an in-
put. Section 4 then deals with two economic equilibria in a single period: ¯rst,
an unconstrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium in which ¯rms in a particular market
choose levels of customer service, or `output', and then purchase the necessary radio
channels to service this output at a licence price set by the regulator. This deter-
mines total demand for radio channels given the licence price. Total supply to these
markets is determined by the regulator who then sets the licence price to equate de-
mand and supply. Firms are assumed to be large in number across all markets and
therefore licence-price takers. This equilibrium is a bench-mark outcome that would
require the regulator to have either complete information on ¯rms' demand and cost
conditions, or to iterate in a Walrasian fashion towards the equilibrium. The second
constrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium lies at the centre of the subsequent analysis.
Now we assume that the total number and distribution of radio channels is ¯xed
and ¯rms choose output subject to what is e®ectively an output capacity constraint.
Section 5 considers intra-market and inter-market bilateral trades between ¯rms.
Section 6 allows for network operators (NOs) which buy network licences as well as
the local operators (LOs) considered in previous sections, and outlines a model of
trade involving NOs and LOs. Section 7 the presents results from a program we have
designed in order to simulate the e®ects of di®erent trading scenarios. Given the
3highly complex patterns that trade might follow (and the high variety of associated
outcomes), such programming is essential for understanding details of the trading
process. We present result to illustrate speci¯c several of these features, rather
than presenting too wide a variety of outcomes. Section 8 concludes by discussing
limitations of the analysis and directions for future research.
2 The Channel Assignment Problem
The channel assignment problem deals with the competing wishes to provide suf-
¯cient radio coverage while at the same time avoiding unacceptable interference
between groups of transmitters (see Leese (1998)). The problem speci¯cation must
therefore include information about the requirements for spectrum across the sys-
tem, and also a set of constraints, designed to limit the interference levels, that a
channel assignment should respect. In the version of the problem used most widely
in practice, the spectrum requirements are given by specifying the number of dis-
tinct channels that each transmitter site requires. So, for instance, if there are n
transmitter sites, called T1;T 2;:::;T n, then we have a corresponding set of demands
m1;m 2;:::;m n, where site Ti requires the assignment of mi distinct channels.
The most useful speci¯cation of constraints is somewhat less clear. The common-
est usual route, which re°ects the use of protection ratios in the radio community,
is to have a set of constraints each relating to either a single transmitter site (called
co-site constraints), or a pair of transmitter sites (called inter-site constraints). To
be explicit, suppose the channels are labelled by integer values, corresponding to











for some speci¯ed minimum channel separation ·i. Likewise, the inter-site con-
straints require that if f(i) and f(j) are channels assigned to two di®erent transmitter




for some speci¯ed minimum channel separation ·ij (equal to ·ji). The constraints
are therefore completely speci¯ed by the numbers ·i and ·ij, which are usually
written in the form of a matrix, called the constraint matrix. The ·i make up the
diagonal entries and the ·ij the o®-diagonal entries.
The ¯nal part of the problem speci¯cation is the objective, for which there are
two natural choices. The ¯rst and most widely studied to date is the minimum
span problem, in which the aim is to ¯nd an assignment satisfying all spectrum
requirements and all interference constraints, for which the span, de¯ned as the
di®erence between the highest and lowest channels used, is as small as possible.
This would tend to be the concern of spectrum regulators and system designers.
The second possibility, which we adopt in this paper and in the demonstrator, is
the ¯xed spectrum problem, in which a maximum span is given (corresponding to
the amount of spectrum available) and the aim is to assign channels to as many
spectrum requirements as possible, within the given span and without violating any
constraints. This would tend to be the concern of system operators, as they attempt
to manage existing services. A variant on the ¯xed spectrum problem would assign
channels to all spectrum requirements and try to minimize the number of violated
constraints.
The above speci¯cation assumes that the transmitter locations and powers are
¯xed (they are e®ectively taken account of by the constraint matrix). More general
formulations could have locations and powers as extra variables, to be optimized
along with the channels, but there has been very little theoretical work on such
problems to date.
Before moving on, it is useful to mention that the constraint matrix described
above can sometimes be over-restrictive. First, it is important to realise that any
mathematical model of the channel assignment problem represents an attempt to
5capture the practical requirements of radio engineers. The success or otherwise
of the whole enterprise is largely determined by the accuracy of translation from
the engineering speci¯cations into mathematical speci¯cations. As far as avoiding
interference is concerned, the radio engineer generally requires that the signal-to-
interference or signal-to-noise ratios should be su±ciently high at all receiver posi-
tions where radio coverage is desired. There is no mention of pairs of transmitters,
but simply a requirement that the combined e®ects of all sources of interference are
su±ciently low. If there are single dominant interferers then a constraint matrix is
likely to be a reasonable mathematical model, but more generally it will be di±cult
to translate the engineering speci¯cation into a matrix form. Putative constraint
matrices will then tend to be either too `loose', in which case they fail to ensure the
desired coverage, or too `tight', in which case they lead to assignments using more
spectrum than necessary.
The channel assignment problem has exercised many researchers over many
years. The standard formulation includes, as a special case, the celebrated graph-
colouring problem. A graph in this context is a collection of abstract `nodes', some
pairs of which are joined by `edges'. The colouring problem is to attach a colour to
each node in such a way that a pair of joined nodes should receive di®erent colours
and the total number of colours used should be as small as possible. The smallest
number of colours needed is called the chromatic number of the graph. If we think
of the nodes as transmitter sites and the colours as channels then we have precisely
a minimum span channel assignment problem, in which all the mi are 1, and the ·ij
are 1 if the nodes Ti and Tj are joined and 0 otherwise. (Since only one channel is
required at each site, the values given to the co-site constraints ·i are immaterial.)
In physical terms, we are modelling only co-channel interference, with the edges in
the graph indicating the rough location of potential coverage blackspots. Figure 1
shows a graph with chromatic number 4, along with a possible valid colouring. (Note
that our conventional de¯nitions mean that the span is one less than the chromatic
6number.)2
Figure 1: A Small Graph with Chromatic Number 4.
We now relate this very general formulation of the channel assignment and graph
colouring problems to an economic model that explains demands for channels in
terms of cost and market conditions. Each `transmitter site' or node in the graph
incorporates a local market consisting of an oligopoly of ¯rms producing a service
which we assume to be homogeneous. A spatial interpretation of nodes or sites is to
regard them as equal cells (e.g. squares) comprising the region under consideration.
A `transmitter site' then consists of all the transmitters used by the ¯rm, and it is
possible that ¯rms can share transmitters, perhaps charging an access price. We
propose this as our `core' economic model.
Each member of the oligopoly requires radio channels to provide the service. In
each cell a local oligopoly provides a local service. Each ¯rm within this market
purchases a licence from the regulator to use a number of channels which depends
2Algorithms for graph-colouring have been extensively studied (see Leese (1998)).
7on the volume of service. The proximity of ¯rms implies that no channel re-use is
possible within a cell and we assume that there is only co-channel interference (i.e.
·i =1 ; ·ij = 0 or 1). The demands for radio channels in each market is the sum
of individual demands of the ¯rms in that market. We model these demands in the
next section.
Figure 2: A 4-Node Graph of 4 Markets
There are now more channels than `colours'. Each cell can now be given a colour
and a shared colour indicates the possibility of `channel re-use' or `sharing' between
these regions. Figures 2 to 4 illustrate this description of the channel assignment
problem using a much simpler 4-node graph. The chromatic number of the graph
in Figure 2 is two and Figure 3 is the corresponding constraint matrix. Figure 4
is the coloured map using two colours. Numbers inside circles are market demands
and in our example demand increases as we proceed from West to East. Because
diagonal squares can share channels the total demand of 60 channels can be serviced
by a minimum of 40 distinct channels: say, 1-10 in market A, 11-30 in market B
of which 11-20 can be re-used in market C. In market D 1-10 can be re-used from
8Figure 3: The Constraint Matrix
market A leaving a further distinct group of channels, say 31-40, to complete the
radio channel requirements of these four markets, given the constraint matrix.
Now consider the possibility of a trade between ¯rms situated in di®erent oligopolies.
If ¯rms are located in the same market (i.e. square), cost conditions may be di®erent
and this provides an incentive to trade channels. If ¯rms occupy di®erent markets
then both demand and cost conditions can be di®erent and this provides a further
incentive to trade. But some channel trades may be ruled out by the regulator for
channel assignment constraint reasons. In the previous example channels 21-30 held
by ¯rms in market B can be re-used by ¯rms in market C. Similarly channels 21-40
in market D can be re-used in market A. For ¯rms in the same market, or in mar-
kets with di®erent colours, only market exchange is possible. For example channels
21-30 in market B can be exchanged with (i.e. transferred to) ¯rms in market A
and channels 31-40 in market D can be exchanged with ¯rms in market C.
It is also of interest to allow for ¯rms to provide a service that covers more than
one square. We refer to these as `network operators' (NOs) as opposed to local
9Figure 4: A Coloured Map of 4 Markets
operators (LOs). Two additional types of trade are now possible: between NOs and
LOs, and those between NOs. This leads us to distinguish between the followings
types of trade.
(i) Trade between LOs in the same market. No channel sharing is possible, only
channel exchange.
(ii) Trade between LOs in di®erent markets. Now both channel sharing and channel
exchange is possible.
(iii) Trade between a NO and LOs in a number of markets. Only channel exchange
is possible.
(iv) Trades between NOs. Both exchange and sharing is possible.
In what follows we focus on trades between LOs only and later in Section 6 we
provide a sketch of trades involving NOs.
103 The Core Economic Model
There are M markets with Nj ¯rms in market j =1 ;2;:::;M. Market j pro-
vides a homogeneous service at the market price Pj with total market output Qj.
The demand curve is given by Qj = D(Pj); D0
j(Pj) < 0 and we assume that
limPj!1 PjDj(Pj) = 0. In what follows we write the inverse demand curve as
Pj = D
¡1
j (Qj)=Pj(Qj) for short. Units of output are customer-minutes provided
per unit of time (say, the ¯nancial year). Without loss of generality we can choose
units such that one unit of `output' in each market requires one radio channel and
output capacity equals the total number of channels available. Let aR be the licence
price per channel per period charged by the regulator and we assume that aR is
independent of the ¯rm and its location.
The incentive to trade channels within a single market originates from di®erent
cost structures between ¯rms. In an initial pre-trade equilibrium suppose that ¯rm
i in market j has purchased rij licences at price aR and produces qij · rij units of
service. We choose the following quadratic functional form for the cost function:
Cij(qij;a
R)=Kij + rija




The Kij are ¯xed costs (typically capital investment) and for dij > 0o r < 0w e
have cases of decreasing or increasing marginal costs respectively. For dij =0w e
have constant marginal costs, as assumed in LLR. This formulation assumes that
each ¯rm is a price taker in factor markets and in the market for licences which
incorporates all local markets such as the one modelled in this section. As in LLR
we assume that the price elasticity of demand in the market, ²j(Qj)=¡
PjdQj
QjdPj,i s
constant with respect to total output Qj.
114 The One-Period Equilibria
4.1 The Unconstrained Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
In the unconstrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium (UCNE), each ¯rm chooses output
and the exact number of licences required to service this output; i.e. rij = qij. Until
we come to inter-market trade we now focus on one market, say j = 1, and to ease
the notation we drop the market subscript j. In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium ¯rm i
then maximizes pro¯ts given by
¦i = Pq i ¡ Ci(qi;a
R)=( P ¡ ci ¡ a





taking the output of all other ¯rms,
PN
j6=i qj =~ qi, say, as given.
Writing P = P(Q)=P(qi +~ qi) and di®erentiating with respect to qi, with ~ qi
¯xed, the ¯rst-order condition for an internal maximum with qi ¸ 0i s
P
0qi +( P ¡ ci ¡ a
R) ¡ diqi = 0 (3)
Then rearranging and using the assumption of a constant elasticity, ¯rm i's market




(P ¡ ci ¡ aR)²
P + diQ²
(4)
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium ci = c, di = d. In LLR we assumed a symmetric







In LLR we show that ² n>²>1 ensures that the price in a symmetric equilibrium is
always positive and is also a su±cient condition for the second-order maximization
condition to be satis¯ed. ²>1 is also necessary for a pro¯t-maximizing level of
output to exist when the market has only one ¯rm. In what follows we therefore
12assume a price elasticity greater than unity.
In this paper we are interested in the case where asymmetries exist between
¯rms. Then in a non-symmetric Nash equilibrium (4) indicates the intuitive result
that, given the licence price aR and the product market price P (which in equi-
librium will depend on aR, as (5) shows), the market share of ¯rm i will increase
as its productive e±ciency rises (i.e. as ci and/or di increase). As ¯rm i becomes
less e±cient its optimal output will approach zero and closure of the ¯rm occurs.
Before this eventuality however, because there are ¯xed costs independent of out-
put, pro¯ts will be driven down to zero. We therefore introduce a participation
constraint ¦i ¸ 0 for ¯rm i in the Nash equilibrium.3 Outputs are given by solving
the following system (subsequently referred to as programme UCNE)o fN · Nmax




) ¡ ci ¡ a













We now make a convenient simplifying assumption to make the process of entry
and exit tractable. We assume that
K1 <K 2 <:::<K Nmax ; c1 <c 2 <:::<c Nmax ; d1 <d 2 <:::<d Nmax (6)
so that the e±ciency of ¯rms 1 to Nmax can be ranked unambiguously in terms of
the cost parameters. Arranging ¯rms in order of e±ciency, if the pro¯ts of the least
e±cient are negative, this ¯rm is eliminated and the procedure is repeated with
3Note that in the presence of ¯xed costs, ¦i ¸ 0 implies that qi > 0.
13the remaining Nmax ¡ 1. This iterative process is repeated until we arrive at the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium with all ¯rms having non-negative pro¯ts.
The number of ¯rms who can participate will depend on the distribution of cost
parameters Ki;c i;d i, the parameters describing demand conditions, A, ² and the
licence price aR. Starting with Nmax potential ¯rms de¯ned by their cost parameters,
¯rms will leave or enter the market as demand conditions and the license price
change. If the regulator releases a ¯xed number of radio channels for the market as
whole, then the market-clearing license price will depend on this number.
Figure 5: Output and Market Demand
Figures 5 to 7 illustrate the process of entry as market demand increases where
the demand function is chosen to be Q = AP ¡² as in LLR. Parameters are chosen
as follows: Nmax =5 ,di =0 ;i =1 ;2;:::;Nmax, ² =1 :1, c1 =0 :80, c2 =0 :81,
c3 =0 :82, c4 =0 :83, c5 =0 :85, Ki =2 :5 and aR =0 :1. From Figure 6 for demand
in the low region A = 50, there are N = 3 ¯rms in equilibrium. This rises to 4
¯rms for A 2 [60;90] and N =5=Nmax at the high level of demand A>90.
Correspondingly, total output rises (Figure 5) and Figure 7 shows the associated
pro¯ts of the 5 ¯rms in these intervals of demand. The most e±cient ¯rm sees its
pro¯ts fall at each point where N increases. Once the number of ¯rms stabilises at
14Figure 6: Participating Firms and Market Demand
N = 5 all ¯rms enjoy increased pro¯t as A increases.
Figures 8 to 10 examine the same process as the licence price increases from
aR = 0, now keeping demand at A = 150. Taking total output ¯rst, Figure 8 shows
that a higher licence price forces up the price and lower output. Interestingly, from
Figures 9 and 10, for our chosen elasticity ² =1 :1, the positive e®ect of a price
increase on the pro¯ts of the least e±cient ¯rm outweighs the negative e®ect of
a higher licence price, allowing it to become viable and enter the market. Pro¯ts
initially fall for the most e±cient four ¯rms but then start to rise. A high licence
fee therefore has the e®ect of redistributing surplus from consumers to producers,
as well as raising revenue for the regulator, and supports a more competitive (high
N) market.
4.2 The Constrained Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
In a constrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium, ¯rm i faces a capacity constraint qi · ri,
where ri is the number of radio channels for which it has licences. It then maximizes
pro¯ts given by






15Figure 7: Pro¯ts and Market Demand
subject to this constraint, taking the output of all other ¯rms,
PN
j6=i qj =~ qi,a s
given, as before. Notice that licencing costs, aRri, are now part of ¯xed costs and
only a®ect the ¯rm's participation constraint.
To carry out this constrained optimization programme, de¯ne the Lagrangian
Li =¦ i + ¸i(ri ¡ qi)+¹i¦i (8)
where ¸i ¸ 0 and ¹i are Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints ri ¸ qi






) ¡ ci ¡ diqi
¸
= ¸i (9)
¹i¦i = ¸i(ri ¡ qi) = 0 (10)
The left-hand-side of equation (9) now de¯nes the function (1 + ¹i)f(qi). Suppose
the participation constraint is satis¯ed; then ¹i =0 .I ff(ri) > 0, then qi = ri and
¯rm i uses all its acquired channels producing at full-capacity. If f(ri) · 0, then the
capacity constraint no longer holds and qi <r i implying spare radio channels and
capacity. In this case, qi is given by (9) with ¹i = ¸i = 0. If in equilibrium ¹i > 0,
16Figure 8: Output and Licence Price
¦i · 0, the ¯rm exits and we put qi = 0 for that ¯rm.
The constrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium (subsequently referred to as pro-






) ¡ ci ¡ diqi
¸
= ¸i












which gives 3N equations in qi, ¹i and ¸i, i =1 ;2;:::;N, given ri;i=1 ;2;:::;N
and aR. As for the unconstrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium, N · Nmax is the
number of ¯rms after exits for which the participation constraint ¦i ¸ 0.
17Figure 9: Participating Firms and Licence Price
5 Channel Trade Between Two Firms
We now allow ¯rms to trade on a bilateral basis. After agreeing to a transfer of
channels at a particular price we assume that no collusion is allowed and the two
¯rms re-optimize with respect to output independently. Before trade commences the
regulator sells radio channels at price aR. In a UCNE, ¯rms acquire these channels
to service their anticipated output.4 No new licences are issued by the regulator
during the course of the trades. Consider a series of trades at time t =1 ;2;:::;
involving two ¯rms at a time. Trades can be intra-market or inter-market and we
consider these in turn.
5.1 Intra-Market Trades
Suppose at time t two ¯rms i = f;g in market j = 1 trade radio channels. As in the
previous section we suppress the market subscript. When they meet at time t they
own rf(t¡1) and rg(t¡1) licences respectively, possibly a®ected by previous trades.
4Alternatively channels may be issued in a ad hoc fashion (which we actually assume in the
results from the demonstrator described in the accompanying report to the Radiocommunications
Agency.)
18Figure 10: Pro¯ts and Licence Price
Let e be the exchange (i.e. transfer) of channels from ¯rm f to ¯rm g at a price to be
agreed by the two parties. We impose a constraint on the number of channels that
they are permitted to exchange so that e · ¹, say, where ¹ is determined by the
regulator. As ¹ is raised we then approach the case where a ¯rm can, if it chooses,
sell all its licences and cease to produce a service.
The sequencing of decisions is important in dynamic games of this type. For
intra-market trades the sequence of events is:
Stage 1. Firms trade and agree a trade of e channels up to a maximum of ¹ chan-
nels, at an exchange price.
Stage 2. Firms independently choose output levels in a new Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium of this stage of the game found by solving the programme CCNE where the
new constraints are:
rf(t)=rf(t ¡ 1) ¡ e; rg(t)=rg(t ¡ 1) + e (11)
The appropriate equilibrium concept is a sub-game perfect equilibrium found
by backward induction at stage 2. Notice that we assume that any future trades are
19so far into the future that these are ignored in this bargaining game.5
5.1.1 The New Constrained Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
Starting with the UCNE with qi = qNE
i etc, it is of interest to examine stage 2
of the game. Each trade redistributes capacity which remains ¯xed in total. If
¯rms continue to produce at full capacity as they do in the initial Cournot-Nash
equilibrium then total output and price remain constant at their levels in the initial
equilibrium. Consumers are una®ected by the trade, but ¯rms bene¯t in this case.
If ¯rms produce below capacity after trade, then total output falls, the price rises
and consumers lose out. The condition for price to remain unchanged in the ¯rst
trade between ¯rms f and g is ¸(ri(1)) > 0 i = f;g where rf(1) = qNE
f ¡ e,
rg(1) = qNE










¡ cf ¡ df(q
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¡ cg ¡ dg(q
NE
g + e) > 0 (13)
Using the ¯rst-order condition for the original Cournot-Nash equilibrium in UCNE

















The participation constraint implies that P NE
i ¡ ci ¡ aR > 0. Hence from the ini-
tial Cournot-Nash equilibrium di + PNE
QNE² > 0 and it follows that (14) always holds.
Hence from condition (15) we have the proposition:
5Alternatively, since all future trades depend on random matches and pro¯ts can rise or fall for
a particular ¯rm as a result of other ¯rms' pro¯ts, we are assuming in e®ect that the expectation
of future single period pro¯ts equals current pro¯t (at stage 2).
20Proposition 1
Starting from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with exogenous licence price
aR, price P NE and output QNE = D(QNE) where D(¢) has a constant elas-
ticity ², then the ¯rst exchange of e channels from ¯rm f to ¯rm g does









Now consider a sequence of p trades between the most e±cient ¯rm, g = 1 and
the least e±cient ¯rms f = N; N ¡1;N¡2;:::;N¡p+1. Let eig = ½iqNE
i be the
trade between ¯rm g and ¯rm i where ½i 2 [0;1] is the proportion of the capacity of
¯rm i transferred to ¯rm g. Then generalizing the argument above, after p trades












N¡1 + ¢¢¢ ½N¡p+1q
NE
N¡p+1) (17)
We can now show a result that con¯rms the fears that unregulated trading can have
anti-competitive e®ects:
Proposition 2
If ½N = ½N¡1 = ¢¢½N¡p+1 =1 , then for some trade p · N ¡ 1 condition (17)
breaks down and channel trading then leads to a reduction in output and
an increase in the price.
For example in the previous numerical example with aR =0 :1 and A = 150 trade
that transfers all radio capacity to the most e±cient ¯rm g = 1 in turn results in a
drop in output after the second trade at which point the number of ¯rms producing
is N =3 .
215.1.2 Bargaining
Now turn to stage 1 of the game where ¯rms agree a number of channels to be
exchanged, e, and the price. First we introduce additional notation. Consider an
initial allocation of licences at time t = 0 and subsequent trades involving pairs of
¯rms at time t =1 ;2;¢¢T. Let aij(t) be the income per period to be received, or if
negative, a payment to be paid at times t;t+1;t+2;¢¢T by ¯rm i in market j as a
result of a trade at time t. Then the total, cumulative income is given by
Aij(t)=aij(t)+aij(t ¡ 1) + ¢¢+aij(T) (18)
As before there are Nj · Nmax
j active ¯rms in market j holding licenses rj(t)=
(r1j(t);r 2j(t);¢¢rNj;j(t)) at time which act as capacity constraints for that period.
In a constrained Cournot-Nash equilibrium the quantity vector q
j(t) and the price
Pj(t) are functions of the state rj(t). Write total pro¯ts ¦ij(t)=¼ij(t)+Aij(t)a sa
sum of operating pro¯ts plus income from trades up to and including period t, where
¼ij(t)=¼ij(rj(t)) = [(Pj(rj(t)) ¡ cij]qij(rj(t)) ¡ Kij ¡ a
Rrij(t) (19)
Consider possible trades at time t between two ¯rms i = f;g from markets
j = m;n, say, with radio channel capacities of rfm(t ¡ 1) and rgn(t ¡ 1) respec-
tively. A solution to the bargain with particularly attractive properties6 is found by
maximizing the Generalized Nash Product.
N(af(t);r fm(t);r gn(t)) = [¦fm(t) ¡ ¦fm(t ¡ 1)]





6These are the four properties stated by Nash: (1) The ¯nal outcome should be independent of
utility units. (2) The agreed outcome should be Pareto-e±cient and better than no trade for both
players. (3) If players sometimes agree on an outcome x when y is feasible, they will never agree
on y when x is feasible (independence of irrelevant alternatives). (4) In symmetric situations, both
players get the same. (See Binmore (1992), page 180)
22with respect to afm(t)=¡agn(t) and [rfm(t);r gn(t)], where ¢¼ij = ¼ij(t)¡¼ij(t¡1)
and where ®fm and ®gn correspond to the bargaining powers of the two ¯rms f in
market m and g in market n, respectively. Given [rfm(t);r gn(t)] and for ®fm = ®gn
(equal bargaining power) it is straightforward to show that the payment made to
¯rm f in market m is given by




In other words, the payment `splits the di®erence' between the gains in terms of
operating pro¯ts to the two ¯rms.
5.2 Inter-Market Trades
We now consider possible trades between ¯rms in di®erent markets. Re-introducing
the subscript to denote a particular market, there are M of these markets and
in market j =1 ;2;:::;M, there are Nj · Nmax
j ¯rms in equilibrium. Costs are
characterised by cost coe±cients fcij;d ij;K ij; i =1 ;2;:::;Nmax
j ;j =1 ;2;:::;Mg
and demand by the demand function Qj = Dj(Pj)=AjP
¡²j
j .
Consider possible trades at time t between two ¯rms i = f;g from markets
j = m;n, say, with radio channel capacities of rfm(t¡1) and rgn(t¡1) respectively.
Whereas before, with intra-market trade, ¯rms could only transfer their channels,
now the scope for trade is far more complicated and depends on the actual channels
the ¯rms possess and the constraint matrix discussed in Section 2. The trading
process now must include a new ¯rst stage in which ¯rms seek permission for trades
from the regulator that satisfy these technical constraints. Thus we now have three
stages of the game:
Stage 1. The two ¯rms consult the regulator and discover which (if any) of their
inherited radio channels rfm(t ¡ 1) and rgn(t ¡ 1) can be traded.
Stage 2. Subject to the constraints of Section 2, ¯rms agree a number of channels
to be traded, up to a maximum allowed by the regulator, and a price.
23Stage 3. Firms choose new output levels in new Cournot-Nash equilibria in both
markets found by solving the programme CCNE.
We can discern two types of inter-market trades: re-use (sharing) of channels
and the exchange of channels. We consider these in turn.
5.2.1 Inter-Market Re-Use
Suppose ¯rm f in market m has channels available to share (re-use) with ¯rm g
in market n and agrees to share a number s up to a maximum imposed by the
regulator as before. After trade nothing changes in market m, but in market n ¯rm
g can increase its radio channel capacity by s channels. At stage 3 of the game the
CCNE is now subject to capacity constraints:
rgn(t)=rgn(t ¡ 1) + s; rfm(t)=rfm(t ¡ 1) (22)
As before at stage 2, the quantity traded and the agreed license price ¢aT
f agreed
in the bargain is found by maximizing the generalized Nash Product.
5.2.2 Inter-Market Exchange
Now suppose ¯rm f in market m has channels available to exchange (transfer) with
¯rm g in market n they agree to exchange a number e up to a maximum imposed
by the regulator. After trade both markets now change and at stage 3 of the game
the CCNE in the two markets is now subject to capacity constraints:
rgn(t)=rgn(t ¡ 1) + e; rfm(t)=rfm(t ¡ 1) ¡ e (23)
.
Allowing for the possibility of exchange in the opposite direction (e<0), there
are now three possible post-trade equilibria:
(i) Some production moves from ¯rm f in market m to ¯rm g in market
n, or vice versa.
24This happens if the relative price in market n, in the new Nash equilibrium, is
su±ciently high and/or the relative cost of ¯rm f is su±ciently high or vice versa.
Some combination of these two factors are required to bring about trade in these
directions.
(ii) Production shifts to the e±cient ¯rm who may also move to the high
demand region.
For example production moves from ¯rm f in market m to ¯rm ¯rm g in market n
who then geographically replaces f.
(iii) One ¯rm takes over the other.
By this we mean that a ¯rm in one market can service the demand in the second
market with a new cost structure that may capture, for example, increasing returns
to scale. In general we are not assuming that all markets produce the same service
(although we do assume a homogeneous good within a market). A takeover therefore
only applies to two ¯rms who are producing the same service but selling in di®erent
markets.
6 Trades Involving Network Operators
Suppose now there are NNO ¯rms operating in all M regions and that ¯rms acquire
network licences which can be used anywhere on the network. Firm i produces
qNO
i units of output across the network of which wijqNO
j are serviced in region j
where
PN
j=1 wij = 1. Figure 11 shows an example of 4 cells as before with the same
constraint matrix. Total output is 100 and numbering cells A, B, C and D as 1,
2, 3, 4 respectively, we have wi1 =0 :2, wi2 =0 :3, wi3 =0 :1 and wi4 =0 :4. If
the costs of servicing a customer are invariant with respect to their location then
the cost structure is exactly as before except for the cost of the channel licences.
For the constraints implied by Figure 11 the minimum number of distinct channels
necessary to service qNO
i units of output are given by
r
min
i = [maxfw1;w 4g + maxfw2;w 4g]q
NO
i (24)
25Figure 11: Demand and Surplus Channels with a Network Operator
which equals 70 for this example. Figure 11 shows a possible channel assignment
of channels 1 ¡ 70. The UCNE follow as before except that the price per channel
is now rminaR <a R because of the scope for sharing channels in cells of the same
colour. The channels shown in rectangles in cells A and C are now surplus and could
be sold on to LOs in these cells or to other NOs which have higher concentrations
of customers in one or both of these cells.
7 Simulation Results
In order to examine the e®ects of licence trading within the above framework, we
have designed a software program (in MathCad 2001). This searches sequentially for
26trades and allows them if gains exist and interference constraints are not violated.
For programming convenience, we assume that ¯rms onty trade one licence at a
time. We choose initial values as follows: Aj =5 ;² j =1 :2;c2f 0:5;1:0;1:5g;n j 2
f1;2;3;6g. We assume six licences per market, which that may be the result of
piecemeal policy over the years.7 We then proceed to look at trades within a single
market (`inter-market trades') and trades between markets `intra-market trades').
Below we present some illustrative ¯ndings.
7.1 Inter-market trades
To begin, consider a market with two ¯rms, with marginal costs of c =( 1 :0; 1:5),
each holding three licences. The initial equilibrium has a market price of 2.14, pro¯ts
o f¦=( 1 :46; 0:46) and consumer surplus of 21.47. Outputs are x =( 1 :28; 0:72).
In this case, there is no incentive to trade: neither ¯rm gains su±ciently from the
price e®ects restricting its rival's output (by buying a licence) and then increasing
its own.
A slight change generates trade, however. Suppose that c =( 0 :5; 1:0), each
¯rm with three licences. Initial market price is 1.29, we have ¦ = (2:13; 0:28)
and consumer surplus of 23.77. Outputs are x =( 2 :71; 0:99)|both high as a
result of the ¯rms' lower marginal costs in this example. There is now an incentive
to trade from ¯rm 1 to 2 (the high cost ¯rm). (Trade the other way would not
alter constraints su±ciently to change outputs.) This restricts ¯rm 1's output and
allows the high cost ¯rm gain su±ciently from the resulting high price to make
trade worthwhile. This indicates the role of licences as credible commitments to
constrain output. In fact, trade will continue here until ¯rm 2 has all six licences
and a high cost monopoly results. ¯nal price is 6, ¯rm 2's pro¯t has doubled to
0.53, but consumer surplus has fallen to 17.47: total welfare (the sum of consumer
surplus and pro¯ts) falls from 26.18 to 20.38.8
7Justi¯cation for these initial con¯gurations can be found in Hurley et al. (2001).
8This result di®ers from our earlier theory, where licences gravitate towards the e±cient ¯rm
27As we allow ² to rise, this result eventually disappears. The reason is straight-
forward: the more elastic is demand, the smaller is the price e®ect of restricting
output, so the lower is the high cost ¯rm's gain rom doing so. Indeed, as ² rises past
1.4, the incentives to trade reverse and a single trade from ¯rm 2 to ¯rm 1 takes
place.
Suppose we now have more ¯rms (say, n = 6), with marginal costs of c =
(0:5; 0:5;; 0:5; 1:0; 1:0; 1:5), and each ¯rm having one licence. A variety of pos-
sibilities now emerge, depending on the sequence of trades. However, the outcomes
can be partitioned into two sets. In the ¯rst of these, one of the low cost ¯rms
monopolises the market (trade ends when it holds all six licences). The productive
e±ciency of this outcome is not always enough, however, to increase total welfare,
because of the resulting increase in price. In the second set of outcomes, each of
the three lowest cost ¯rms ¯nishes with two licences (the others have none). In this
case, the bene¯ts of low cost production are enough to o®set the (weaker) e®ects of
concentration on price, with the result that this set typically increases total welfare.9
7.2 Intra-market trades
Now suppose that there are four markets, with associated interference constraints
as pictured in Figure 2. A key issue now emerges because it is possible for trading
not to terminate. The reason is that the transfer of a licence across markets has
e®ects on prices in both. Thus, ¯rms that may not have been thinking of trading
may suddenly become keen to do so. One solution to this is to introduce a threshold
because of our programming assumption that the initial allocation of licences is arbitrary. This
may re°ect the `real world' situation, but also means that there may be ine±ciency in the initial
position from which trade takes place. The result does, however, indicate the role played by licences
in this set-up. E®ectively, they provide credible output commitments in the sense that, if ¯rm 1
buys a licence from ¯rm 2 (whose output constraint was binding), this must force ¯rm 2's output
down. Thus, unlike other Cournot settings, ¯rm 1 will enter the trade certain that the resulting
market price will not be competed down by deviation from its rival.
9100 replications of the program produced the second outcome 25 times, a statistically signif-
icantly smaller number of times than the ¯rst outcome. To the extent that the regulator would
prefer the second outcome, it would be interesting to examine institutional arrangements that
encourage trading patterns which generate this.
28gain from trade below which trades do not take place.10 In this case, convergence
of the trading process becomes more common (in the sense that trading becomes
increasingly infrequent as searches for trades take place).
To give an example, assume there are two ¯rms in each market in Figure 2 (i.e.
8 ¯rms in total) and recall that, given the ¯gure, channels cannot be re-used at
adjacent nodes, but can be at diagonally opposite ones. One ¯rm in each market
has marginal co st of 0.5, the other has marginal cost of 1.0. There are 9 channels:
Market A has channels 1 and 2; B has channel 3; C has channels 1, 2 and 9; and
D has channels 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. This allocation satis¯es the interference matrix
constraints in Figure 2.) The details of how these are split amongst the ¯rms can
be found in Hurley et al. (2001). Now suppose a trading threshold of 1; i.e. only
trades yielding gains of at least this much can take place. In this case, one trade
takes place (from the high cost ¯rm in D to that in B). This raises output and lowers
price in B su±ciently to increase total welfare (aggregated across the four markets).
A lower trading threshold (0.75) encourages a second trade and welfare decreases
in our examples. Moving to a threshold of 0.5 encourages enough trade that local
monopolies can emerge. In particular, we ¯nd that the low cost ¯rm in each case
acquires three licences each but that total welfare drops. Once the threshold is
at 0.2, trade ceases to terminate|an interesting result given that the number of
markets, and ¯rms in each, is relatively small.
8 Conclusions and Future Research
We have presented a model to investigate the potential economic e®ects of spectrum
trading amongst ¯rms who require spectrum licences as part of their activities. Trad-
ing takes place within the technical interference constraints enforced by a regulator.
The model can, in principle, accommodate a variety of markets and ¯rms, as well
as both channel exchange and channel re-use (i.e. sharing across di®erent markets).
10One possible interpretation of this would be a lump-sum tax imposed on the `capital gains'
resulting from a trade.
29Our most detailed analytical results have focused on trade amongst oligopolists in a
given (geographical) market. In this context, our results suggest that trade can en-
hance productive e±ciency by placing licences in the hands of ¯rms who value them
most (i.e. low-cost ¯rms). However, there is a danger that this process may cause
higher consumer prices which, in turn, could o®set the welfare e®ects of lower cost
production. Subsequent discussion suggests that similar forces are likely to prevail
in the other market settings we cover. An important outcome of our modelling is to
make clear a role played by licences: they provide credible commitment mechanisms
to restrict output. Unlike in other Cournot settings, the sale of a licence forces a
¯rm's output down (assuming it was fully utilising its licences): the licences act as
capacity constraints.
We have also presented numerical results to illustrate the outcomes trade might
create. In the context of inter-market trades, we showed that trade need not occur
and that, if initial allocations are not optimal, they may induce high-cost monopolies.
Other examples illustrated the trade-o® from out theoretical model: productive
e±ciency versus price rises through increased concentration: we found cases where
trade increased and decreased welfare. We have also seen that the outcomes of
trading my be pathological, with some outcomes being more desirable than others.
This suggests that the design of trading institutions matters. Turning to intra-
market trades, we have seen that trade generally will not terminate, because of
external price e®ects as licences are transferred across markets. The imposition of
suitable trading thresholds can overcome this problem. Further simulation work is
required to gain a full understanding of the complex forces underlying these results,
but our illustrative results suggest that trade may have a variety of outcomes.
There are a number of directions in which our work could be extended in order
to provide a more complete picture of the e®ects of spectrum trading. To begin
with, our model assumes complete information between potential traders. This may,
perhaps, be feasible amongst local taxi ¯rms (at least as a ¯rst approximation),
where market conditions and competitors may be well known. It is less likely,
30however, to prevail for inter-market trades or for trades between network operators,
where the potential for commercially sensitive information and strategic behaviour
may be signi¯cant. In such circumstances, the costs of reaching agreement can
be signi¯cant, as experience negotiating network access terms in New Zealand has
demonstrated (see Spiller and Cardilli (1997)).
This suggests that the e±ciency of the trading process we have modelled may be
compromised be two types of transactions cost associated with information asym-
metries: bargaining costs and search costs. In the ¯rst case, our use of the Nash
bargaining solution may need modi¯cation to allow for other potential disagree-
ments between negotiators. Such `non-cooperative bargaining' involves considerable
technical complexity (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990); Kennan and Wil-
son (1993)) and may, for practical purposes, constrain the situations that can be
modelled. One possible means of overcoming the potential hold-out problems that
can arise here is provided by the US Clean Air mini-auctions: the evidence suggests
that these helped identify an appropriate range of prices for pollution permits and,
therefore, kick-started the pattern of bilateral trades.
Turning to search costs, our model assumes that parties can identify potential
traders costlessly. While, again, this may not be unreasonable in a small local
market, it will be harder to achieve in a densely populated local market or in many
inter-market trades. Theoretical work on `matching' in markets provides some useful
algorithms for resolving these problems (see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), ch. 9)
and it would be sensible to investigate how easily these could be incorporated into
the current demonstrator.
Another aspect of trading that we have not considered is the temporal aspect
where ¯rms trade and bargain taking into account the implications of each trade
for future production and trades. Simultaneous trades also raise complications. We
have circumvented these problems by assuming that trades are sequential and the
time between each trade is su±ciently great to warrant a myopic calculation of
the consequences of the next trade. These assumptions are clearly restrictive. By
31relaxing our assumption that ¯rms are myopic, spectrum would become an asset,
and we would need to consider the potential for intermediate `spectrum agents' and
expectations-based trading.
In terms of extensions, it would also be possible to consider other forms of market
competition (such as Bertrand price competition) and product di®erentiation within
a geographical market. Both of these would ¯t the current framework, and would
allow the model to cover a particularly wide variety of market situations.
Finally, it is important to make clear how our current work (and potential exten-
sions) can link into the current policy consultations in the UK. The Radiocommu-
nications Agency (2001) consultative document (pp. 33{38) raises several questions
in relation to spectrum trading. To illustrate how our work may be adapted to con-
sider such questions, we suggest three links here. To begin, there are questions of
whether trading may damage allocative e±ciency by encouraging anti-competitive
practices (para. 106); this is a danger illustrated by the current demonstrator. Next,
the document asks how such trade might a®ect investment by existing and potential
operators (para. 111); this is a question that could be examined by adding an initial
investment period to our existing set-up.
As our third illustration, Question xxxvii asks what \market infrastructure" may
be needed to facilitate trade. This echoes mini-auctions used under the US Clean
Air Act and suggests that we should consider the role for market intermediaries
to lubricate trade. Our work also suggests another intriguing institutional factor
that may lubricate trade: the initial allocation of spectrum amongst ¯rms. Simple
re°ection on graphs like that in Figure 2 indicate that there may be circumstances
where interference constraints reject otherwise productively e±cient trades. A solu-
tion to this would be for the regulator to make available extra measures of spectrum
(perhaps more than that required to meet current demands). This could allow ¯rms
to `trade round' interference problems and place licences with low-cost ¯rms.
It is clear that much interesting work remains to be done before the net e®ects
of spectrum trading can be fully understood. Hopefully, however, the present paper
32demonstrates the potential bene¯ts of integrating economic and channel assignment
tools for analysing the issues involved. The model is °exible enough to be extended in
a variety of ways and may, therefore, provide a useful framework for future research
in this important policy area.
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